• Peter Korsgaard's avatar
    asterisk: security bump to version 14.6.2 · 7776e245
    Peter Korsgaard authored
    Fixes the following security issues:
    
    14.6.1:
    
    * AST-2017-005 (applied to all released versions): The "strictrtp" option in
      rtp.conf enables a feature of the RTP stack that learns the source address
      of media for a session and drops any packets that do not originate from
      the expected address.  This option is enabled by default in Asterisk 11
      and above.  The "nat" and "rtp_symmetric" options for chan_sip and
      chan_pjsip respectively enable symmetric RTP support in the RTP stack.
      This uses the source address of incoming media as the target address of
      any sent media.  This option is not enabled by default but is commonly
      enabled to handle devices behind NAT.
    
      A change was made to the strict RTP support in the RTP stack to better
      tolerate late media when a reinvite occurs.  When combined with the
      symmetric RTP support this introduced an avenue where media could be
      hijacked.  Instead of only learning a new address when expected the new
      code allowed a new source address to be learned at all times.
    
      If a flood of RTP traffic was received the strict RTPsupport would allow
      the new address to provide media and with symmetric RTP enabled outgoing
      traffic would be sent to this new address, allowing the media to be
      hijacked.  Provided the attacker continued to send traffic they would
      continue to receive traffic as well.
    
    * AST-2017-006 (applied to all released versions): The app_minivm module has
      an “externnotify” program configuration option that is executed by the
      MinivmNotify dialplan application.  The application uses the caller-id
      name and number as part of a built string passed to the OS shell for
      interpretation and execution.  Since the caller-id name and number can
      come from an untrusted source, a crafted caller-id name or number allows
      an arbitrary shell command injection.
    
    * AST-2017-007 (applied only to 13.17.1 and 14.6.1): A carefully crafted URI
      in a From, To or Contact header could cause Asterisk to crash
    
    For more details, see the announcement:
    https://www.asterisk.org/downloads/asterisk-news/asterisk-11252-13171-1461-116-cert17-1313-cert5-now-available-security
    
    14.6.2:
    
    * AST-2017-008: Insufficient RTCP packet validation could allow reading
      stale buffer contents and when combined with the “nat” and “symmetric_rtp”
      options allow redirecting where Asterisk sends the next RTCP report.
    
      The RTP stream qualification to learn the source address of media always
      accepted the first RTP packet as the new source and allowed what
      AST-2017-005 was mitigating.  The intent was to qualify a series of
      packets before accepting the new source address.
    
    For more details, see the announcement:
    https://www.asterisk.org/downloads/asterisk-news/asterisk-11253-13172-1462-116-cert18-1313-cert6-now-available-security
    
    
    
    Drop 0004-configure-in-cross-complation-assimne-eventfd-are-av.patch as this
    is now handled differently upstream (by disabling eventfd for cross
    compilation, see commit 2e927990b3d2 (eventfd: Disable during cross
    compilation)).  If eventfd support is needed then this should be submitted
    upstream.
    Signed-off-by: default avatarPeter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
    Reviewed-by: default avatar"Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
    (cherry picked from commit 3f1d2c6c746a04d19a493f4e7b866e84e3aa7dc8)
    Signed-off-by: default avatarPeter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
    7776e245